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Abstract 
On 4th and 5th December 2015, ENTraNCE for Executives 
had its second workshop, dealing with the antitrust concerns 
raised by traditional and online platforms. The event was 
divided into 4 panels over two half-days. The workshop 
gathered different stakeholders, who exchanged ideas 
concerning the challenges of enforcing competition rules 
in markets where platforms play a central role. Attendees 
included representatives of National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs), international organizations, academia, industry, as 
well as law and consulting firms. 
The workshop generated a lively debate. While there was 
consensus among participants on some issues, it also 
emerged that a number of questions needed to be further 
investigated. This policy brief aims at summarizing the main 
points raised during the discussion. Moreover, the brief aims 
at stimulating further debate and defining the background 
for a possible follow-up workshop on the same topic. 
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1. Definitions 
The first issue faced by participants was to find 
common definitions as starting point for further 
reasoning. Attendees agreed that the relevant 
terminology is used in a confused and often 
improper way. For example, the terms platform 
and two-sided markets are neither interchangeable 
nor necessarily linked. Secondly, while there are no 
doubts about the fact that developments in digital 
technologies facilitated the diffusion of platforms, 
there are still uncertainties about which are the 
essential features of a platform operating in two or 
multi-sided markets. 
Typically, a two-sided platform can be defined as a 
firm that acts as a platform and sells two different 
products or services to two different groups of 
customers, taking into account that the demand 
from at least one group of customers depends on 
the demand from the other group of customers. 
Moreover, in a two-sided platform, customers of 
the two groups do not consider, and anyway are 
unable to internalize, the indirect network effects.. 
On the basis of this definition participants agreed 
that a number of the online platforms are not 
properly working as two-sided markets (i.e. most 
online newspapers and media content which rely on 
subscribers). 
During the discussion, a distinction was put forward 
between transaction and non-transaction platforms, 
depending on whether there is or not a transaction 
with the end-users which is observable on the 
platform itself. In case of transaction platforms, the 
latter can ask for a fee on each transaction. Although 
still important, such distinction is somewhat 
blurring in practice. For example, on the advertising 
market, if a user clicks on an advertisement link 
an interaction visible by the platform takes place. 
The same dynamic appears with mobile payments: 
geolocation technologies over smartphones allow 
the operating system to see the transaction. 
Participants reflected on the fact that the two-
sidedness of a platform can derive either from its 
nature or from contractual arrangements among 
the platform and the users on one or the other side. 
Therefore, a platform can be two-sided also because 
of the business models it adopts. 
Finally, attendees noted that there is a difference 
between the concept of intermediary and that one 
of two-sided platform. In fact, not all intermediary 
platforms are two-sided; consumers could not care 
about the number of producers that sell on the 
intermediary and producers could not care about 
the number of consumers once they are paid by the 
intermediary. Briefly, the two-sidedness depends 
on the degree of pass-through within the platform: 
the higher the pass-through, the lower the two-
sidedness.
1. 2. Relevant market 
The second issue participants debated about was how 
to define the relevant market in case of platforms, 
and how many relevant markets are there. 
Since in transaction platforms the product or service 
is sold either on both sides of the market or on none, 
then the relevant market should include both sides. 
In fact, in those cases, either a company competes 
on either parts, or nothing; here, the distinction 
between buyer and seller loses value. However, 
attendees noted that in transaction platforms, for a 
transaction to take place both sides of the platform 
have to be convinced; the issue then is to identify 
who has the power to decide if such transaction 
actually takes place through the given intermediary 
or not. On the contrary, attendees seemed to share 
the view that in case of non-transaction platforms, 
the product or service is distinctly one sided, and 
therefore two interrelated markets should be 
identified. 
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Moreover, it was argued that the relevant EU 
case-law does not provide clear-cut guidance. For 
example, in the Google/Double Click case1 only one 
market was taken into account during the merger’s 
assessment. On the contrary, in the MasterCard 
case2, the Commission looked at two interrelated 
markets. As known, the company appealed the 
decision, but it did not appeal the market definition.
In any event, there appeared to be consensus on 
the fact that while identifying the relevant markets 
competition authorities have to apply the SSNIP test 
taking into account the peculiar features of the two-
sidedness, where present.  
Furthermore, some expressed the idea that more 
and more the concept of relevant market is matched 
with the concept of industry; while the concept of 
platform is often matched with that of a single firm. 
If this becomes true, than the possible antitrust 
intervention should lose its traditional features and 
concentrate on individual targets. Pros and cons 
of this development where lively debated among 
participants.
Finally, it was suggested that while looking at the 
relevant market, the geographical dimension should 
be duly taken into account; in fact, the majority of 
platform markets are either global or regional in 
scope. 
1 European Commission Decision, Case No COMP/M.4731 
– Google/ DoubleClick,  Brussels, 11.03.2008. C (2008) 
927 final. 
2 European Commission Decision, Case COMP/34.579 
— MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 — EuroCommerce, 
Case COMP/38.580 — Commercial Cards, Brussels, 
19.12.2007, 2009/C 264/04.
3. Market power 
Participants debated the application of the traditional 
legal definition of significant market power in case 
of two-sided markets. Participants agreed that the 
price on one side of the platform depends on the 
price elasticity on both sides, on the marginal costs 
on both sides and eventually on the degree of indirect 
network effects. Therefore, the marginal costs and 
the prices on both sides should be summed up and 
compared. However, a problematic issue remains: 
the competitive benchmark for the price on the one 
side; in fact, in case of platforms it is not always true 
that competition pushes the price of one side down 
(this is, for example, the case of Google Maps). 
A number of additional questions were raised 
during the discussion. Attendees noted that even in 
those cases where there is no payment on one side, 
that is when a product/service is provided free of 
charges, there is still a market, and thus we need 
to interrogate ourselves about market power of the 
platform. However, in such cases it is difficult to 
identify buyers and sellers, and participants agreed 
on the fact that the most correct terminology would 
be “users”. 
Moreover, attendees highlighted again that dynamics 
are different depending on whether there is or not 
interaction among the two-sides of the platform. 
In fact, in case, for example, of newspapers or 
car businesses, there is no interaction and thus it 
remains unclear what is the competitive benchmark 
for prices.
Another element taken into due account was the 
length of market power. Attendees wondered 
whether in those fast-moving markets with direct 
and indirect externalities, competition is truly 
“a click away”, and what is the role of innovation 
in defining market power. On the one hand, 
the tendency to monopoly in such markets is 
undisputable; this is why a number of participants 
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argued that we should talk about competition for 
the market rather than competition in the market. If 
this is the case, then the question rises whether it is 
truly efficient to have only one platform or whether 
many would be preferable, and why. 
This, in turn, triggers the question on what 
competition authorities should do, and how they 
should protect the competitive process, which should 
guarantee innovation and avoid that consumers are 
locked-in by resilient players. There appeared to be 
consensus on the fact that antitrust policy should 
have the role of preserving a competitive ecosystem, 
although some uncertainties remain on which 
could be the best suited tools to achieve this goal. 
For example, does the relevance of business model 
coupled with competition for the market dynamics 
mean that authorities have to protect specific 
business models? On a different issue, if a market 
cannot anymore operate if network effects do not 
exist, what are competition authorities supposed to 
do?
Moreover, participants debated at length about 
the criteria that should be used to identify market 
powers and thus the key competitors. Some argued 
that traditional criteria might not be enough, and 
that we need new and more solid ones. As a way of 
example, market shares do not appear very suitable, 
because: (i) indirect networks effects are not taken 
into account when measuring market shares;  (ii) in 
fast growing markets, a very strong market position 
on day one, could be challenged on day two if there 
are no barriers to enter the market; and (iii) it does 
not consider barriers to entry. 
Another criterion lively debated was the possession 
of big amount of data. In Facebook/WhatsApp merger 
decision3 the Commission has described for the first 
time a strong market position of the platform in terms 
3 European Commission Decision, Case M.7217 – 
Facebook/ WhatsApp.  Brussels, 03.10.2014 
 C(2014), 7239 final. 
of large amount of data. Another interesting case 
is Booking.com4; participants wondered whether, 
because of the data it has gathered, this platform 
will have a competitive advantage over any other 
new platform, and whether this could constitute a 
barrier to market entry. Some participants argued 
that competition authorities could intervene to 
guarantee that customers are allowed to portability 
of all data. Such strong intervention would be 
similar, for example, to the one about portability 
of numbers imposed to telecommunications 
companies in the previous decade. Some noted that 
big data are essential also in the insurance market. 
There, the practice of collecting data on one market 
in order to provide better or more products/services 
on another market could become essential in the 
near future; therefore, some considered desirable 
the European Commission could look at this issue 
in details. 
In more general terms, nowadays tremendous 
attention is dedicated to the issue of big data and 
analytics, and this is demonstrated, among others, 
by the joint study that the French and German 
competition authorities are currently conducting on 
the possibility to consider data as additional criteria 
to establish market power.5
 
4 Decisions of the French, Italian and Swedish NCAs 
accepting commitments from Booking.com case are 
available at:
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.
php?id_rub=606&id_article=2534 (11.1.2016)
 http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/allegati-news/
I779_chiusura.pdf/download.html 
 http://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/commitments-
given-by-booking-com-benefit-consumers 
5  See, among others: http://www.august-debouzy.com/
en/f lash/001225-competition-and-big-data-french-
competition-authority-eve-starting-sector-inquiry.html
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A number of attendees suggested that processing 
of data on a systematic way could constitute and 
additional and independent criterion for mergers’ 
assessment, as well as a pre-emptive defence. 
However, a few questions remain unanswered, such 
as how to properly calculate the economic value of 
data and where to fix the relevant thresholds. 
As a conclusion, participants stressed that market 
power in itself is not an antitrust issue; thus, owning 
big data should be per sé neutral in competition 
terms, as long as no abusive behaviours take place. 
4. Platforms as facilitators of concerted 
practices
Following some scholars’ classification, participants 
debated about four categories of concerted practices 
facilitated by platforms: (i) messengers: where 
computers are used to assist in implementing and/
or monitoring a cartel; (ii) hub and spoke: where an 
algorithm is used to determine a market price charged 
by numerous users; (iii) ‘predictable agent’: where 
humans design a machine to deliver predictable 
outcomes and react in a given way to changing 
market conditions; and (iv) autonomous machine: 
where machines  are programmed to determine 
means to achieve given target (e.g. optimise profit) 
through self-learning and experiment. 
Each of these categories, except perhaps the first one, 
raises specific antitrust concerns. Hub and spoke 
can become a cluster of vertical agreements. In case 
of predictable agent’s models, if the entire industry 
adopts the same algorithm, this could lead to anti-
competitive effects. Finally, the case of autonomous 
machines appears the most challenging, as the 
anti-competitive effect could verify without any 
communications among machines and without any 
anti-competitive intent. 
Participants debated on whether competition 
authorities are well equipped to deal with these 
cases. There was consensus about the fact that self-
learning algorithms are the most critical situation. 
Some suggested that competition law it is not well 
positioned to address these specific concerns, and 
that perhaps a regulatory intervention would be 
best placed. In any case, attendees seemed aware of 
the fact that, considering that we are going towards 
a future of the Internet of Things (IoT), the choice 
we make today will have enormous consequences 
on the tomorrow’s scenario. 
As examples of case law dealing with platforms as 
facilitators of concerted practices, the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Mastercard,6 
Groupement de Cartes Bancaires,7 Treuhand,8 the 
opinion of the Advocate General in Eturas9 and 
the Commission decisions in the interest rate 
derivatives cartels10 have been discussed in details 
during the workshop. 
The AC Treuhand case shows that even consultancy 
firms can be seen as platforms. Participants 
reflected on whether, in case of consultancies, there 
should be mutual agreement among the parties, 
and specifically if the awareness of the consultancy 
firm concerning the competition law infringement 
would be needed to speak about infringements. 
6 Case C-382/12, MasterCard and others v. Commission 
(2014), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201.
7 Case C-67/13, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v 
Commission (2014), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204.
8 Case C-194/14, AC-Treuhand AG v European Commission 
(2015), ECLI:EU:C:2015:350.
9 Opinion of the Advocate General Szpunar in Ethuras 
and others v. Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba 
delivered on 16.7.2015. ECLI:EU:C:2015:493.
10 The text of the decisions is available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html (11.1.2016).
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Moreover, following the JPY Libor Commission 
decision, also a broker can be seen as a facilitator. 
More specifically, the behaviours of (i) disseminating 
misleading information to certain JPY Libor panel 
banks to influence their JPY Libor submissions; (ii) 
using its contacts with several non-participant JPY 
Libor panel banks to influence their submissions; 
and (iii) serving as a communications channel 
between two traders can be interpreted as activities 
strongly facilitating the cartel. Peculiar reasoning is 
necessary when entities standing outside the system 
can be seen as facilitators. 
The case of MasterCard clarifies that an association 
of undertakings could also act as cartel facilitator. 
In such case, the collective interest plays a role; in 
fact, in the case at stake the whole organisation 
pursued the same objective both before and after 
Initial Public Offering. However, participants 
noted that the presence of more schemes on one 
market sometimes leads to less competition, not 
more; therefore, reverse competition dynamics may 
apply. In addition, the interchange fees mechanism 
adopted by MasterCard is a meaningful example 
of pricing policy in a two-sided market, as far as it 
constitutes a useful tool to balance the costs on the 
two sides.  
Another issue deeply debated concerned the 
analysis under Article 101 TFEU of such facilitating 
behaviours. First, the assessment of a conduct under 
Article 101 (1) TFEU requires to take into due 
account the two-sidedness of the markets as part 
of the actual context where the conduct takes place. 
Second, it also imposes to consider any balancing 
elements (such as combating free-riding) needed to 
identify whether there is a restriction of competition, 
and whether this is by object or effect restriction. 
Third, once established that the measure is liable 
to restrict competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, 
the economic advantages flowing from it should be 
assessed under Article 101(3) TFEU. Participants 
called for attention over these steps, as well as over 
the fact that using Article 101(1) rather than 101(3) 
TFEU can have enormous consequences on the 
results of the market analysis.
As general take-overs from the relevant case law, 
attendees agreed on the fact that the two-sidedness 
can complicate the antitrust assessment, that the 
specific elements of each case matter, and make 
it more difficult to properly analyse the market 
and find solutions, when needed. However, some 
attendees also suggested that, if on the one side 
technological developments bring about new 
challenges, on the other side, the case law sends the 
message that a number (the majority?) of traditional 
antitrust concepts can be applied relatively easily to 
them. 
Before closing the session, a peculiar and interesting 
case was debated: the new regulatory framework 
for financial benchmarking. It was explained that, 
within the old system of benchmarking, calculation 
was made by an agent (Euribor) that fixed the 
index and disseminated it widely. On the one 
hand, Euribor was thus a benchmark of systemic 
importance for financial stability. On the other hand, 
the uncertainty regarding the integrity of Euribor’s 
reference rates represented a potentially serious 
vulnerability and risk for the entire system. There 
was a clear conflict of interest at the management 
level and no Chinese walls to address it nor a robust 
governance regime. This caused, among others, 
losses for consumers and investors. In conclusion, 
there was a need for action, felt and called for by 
all market operators.  The reaction of supervisors 
and regulatory authorities has been strong and a 
new governance structure has been imposed by 
regulation. In conclusion, this case is extremely 
meaningful both because of the intensity of the 
regulatory intervention and the high appreciation 
6 ■  ENTraNCE | March 2016
of such intervention by market operators. However, 
participants have been hesitant towards an invasive 
and more generalised regulatory intervention in 
the payment sector. Some argued that regulation 
could help in very exceptional situation only and 
if justified by certain kind of policy objectives. For 
example, the reason to intervene in the payment 
sector was that the practice was seriously hampering 
the internal market. Thus, the regulatory objective 
was to lower the fees, but also to open national 
markets. Some made a comparison with the reasons 
behind the regulatory intervention in the telecom 
sector. However, it was noted that while some years 
ago each telco’s network was considered a market, 
at least for call termination, on the contrary each 
acquiring bank does not constitute a market at least 
for the moment.
5. Platforms and anti-competitive clauses
A lot of debate was devoted to the analysis of clauses, 
widely used by platform businesses that have likely 
anti-competitive effects. The first discussed clause 
was the price parity clause. It has been suggested 
that such closes can be distinguished in narrow 
price parity (for example, in the case of online travel 
agencies, the parity applies only between the hotel 
and the single agency) and wide price parity (in the 
same example, the hotel promises the same rate to 
all online agencies). 
Participants agreed on the fact that the main issue in 
case of price parity clauses is to identify the specific 
theory of harm. In fact, it might be difficult to apply 
Article 101 TFEU if the welfare effects of the clause 
are not clear. Some call for the use of presumptions, 
others for recourse to the infringement “by object” 
category, which leaves the defendant no other option 
than finding a solid efficiency defence. The problem 
then resides at the level of probation: how to prove 
adequately the anticompetitive effect, and how to do 
the same with the efficiency defence. 
Furthermore, the question was raised on how to 
proceed when is the overall industry that creates anti-
competitive effects, and not the single agreement. 
The French Law 2015-990 for economic growth 
and activity, known as the “Macron Law”,11 appears 
to have undertaken this approach while instigating 
further rules that apply horizontally to all contracts 
for online reservations between hotels and Online 
Travel Agencies. 
On the other side, authorities of a number of Member 
States (e.g.  France, Sweden and Italy) have closed 
their investigations against Booking.com accepting 
the commitments submitted by the respective 
relevant company. However, there appeared to be 
various views on such commitments: while some 
participants considered them an effective tool, 
others raised concerns about their legitimacy. They 
reckon that, especially in the Booking case, but 
also more widely, there has been a failure in the 
communication to the public, which is unhappy 
with the solutions adopted. 
Moreover, if the competition issues are the same in 
the different Member States, than the commitments 
accepted by different NCAs should be the same. 
However, participants noted that this is only true 
insofar as market conditions are similar in each 
relevant State. In any case, they wondered whether the 
European Competition Network played an adequate 
role in this situation, or whether it could have done 
more to manage a more efficient and coordinated 
decentralised enforcement of competition rules. 
Some also argued that the European Commission 
could have been best placed to decide for the entire 
EU territory, and avoid the Booking business model 
to be accepted in some member States, but not in 
others. 
11 The text of the legislation is available at: http://
w w w.leg i f ra nce.gouv.f r/jopdf//jopdf/2015/0807/
joe_20150807_0001.pdf (11.1.2016).
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After looking at recent cases, attendees agreed on 
the fact that numerous questions remain open 
with regard to parity agreements across platforms, 
many of which were discussed during the OECD 
roundtable that took place on 25-26 October 2015. 
As for the anticompetitive concerns, it was observed 
that if entry strategy has high costs, especially in 
cases of network effects, this could create barriers 
to entry. Moreover, if inter-brand competition is 
removed, platforms have no incentives to improve 
quality aspects such fraud protection mechanisms, 
etc. On the other hand, hotels have no incentives to 
reduce their prices, but only to put pressure on the 
platform to obtain a reduced commission. If those 
effects verify consistently, one might argue that 
the entire business model of online travel agencies 
should be reconsidered, because not sustainable 
from a competition perspective. 
However, on the other side, the likely efficiencies 
created by parity clauses were also considered. Some 
suggested that these clauses are able to solve some of 
the free-riding problems created by consumers. The 
latter it is not a hypothetical concern, but a concrete 
one, which nevertheless depends on the degree. 
However, some added that in order to better assess 
if the price parity clause is truly indispensable to 
avoid this problem, the level of investment made by 
the platform should be taken into account.
Nevertheless, there appeared to be consensus on the 
fact that to say that competition among hotels would 
be untenable without commitments is a too strong 
statement, which protects business models more 
than eliminating a competitive concern. In view of 
these difficulties, some participants suggested that 
trial-and-error remedies could be the best solution 
to properly address the current competition issues 
in the online travel agencies sector. 
Participants identified other four types of potentially 
anticompetitive clauses: (i) exclusivity, (ii) tying, 
(iii) Across platforms party agreements (APPA), 
and (iv) horizontal agreements (from coordination 
to mergers). They all have specific economic trade-
off, which were closely analysed. 
A specific attention was dedicated to mergers among 
online platforms. It was noted that often those 
mergers are not assessed in depth by the competent 
authority. The latter tend to justify such lack of 
analysis with the absence of entry barriers in the 
market. However, it was noted that in numerous 
cases a substantial price increase verifies after the 
merger. This leads to the conclusion that there are 
often some entry costs, which are essential for the 
analysis and should not be ignored by the authority 
assessing the merger. 
Among the conclusive observations made while 
debating about anti-competitive clauses often used 
by platforms, some participants drew the attention 
on the role of various additional actors. Some 
discussed whether, in case of commitments, we could 
imagine a concurrent power of national regulatory 
authorities, which have a deeper knowledge of many 
relevant markets and could thus intervene quicker 
and in a more efficient way. Others noted that where 
competition authorities do not intervene, are late 
in doing so or do not have the necessary powers, 
the national parliaments have taken action, and that 
they wondered whether it is desirable that they do it 
more frequently.
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6. Exploitative v. Exclusionary Conducts 
Facilitated by Platforms
The next topic debated during the workshop 
concerned the exploitative and exclusionary 
conducts that could be facilitated by the use of a 
platform. As a starting point, it was highlighted that 
it is difficult to identify a clear dividing line between 
the two categories of abuses. This happens because 
platforms constitute only a segment in the value 
chain and, especially in case of vertically integrated 
platforms, exclusionary and exploitative concerns 
might intertwine along the chain. This means that, 
for example, an exclusionary behaviour towards a 
rival at a certain level of the value chain could harm 
consumers elsewhere in the same chain. Moreover, 
the interdependence between different categories of 
users complicates the picture. 
A number of cases were identified that have both 
exclusionary and exploitative features, among 
others the E.On case12 from November 2008 on 
withholding capacity and balancing, and the 
ongoing Google case13. In the E.On case, the market 
power was used in different way in the short and 
long term, affecting different actors (i.e. consumers 
and other producers, respectively). In the Google 
case, the attention seemed to focus not only in 
an exclusionary clause, but also on exploitative 
behaviours: in fact, the Commission accuses 
Google to use its market power to achieve sub 
optimal results (i.e. consumers do not necessarily 
see the most relevant comparison in shopping 
12 European Commission Decision, Cases COMP/39.388 – 
German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/39.389 
– German Electricity Balancing Market. Brussels, 
26.11.2008.  
13 Updated information concerning the ongoing European 
Commission investigations concerning Google is 
available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/
case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740 (11.1.2016).
results). However, various attendees wondered if 
this truly constitutes a new concern for competition 
authorities. In fact, even if the exclusionary practice 
creates an exploitative effect at a different line of the 
value chain, nevertheless the remedy addressing the 
exclusionary effect should be able to eliminate the 
exploitative one as well. 
There was consensus on the fact that to address 
exploitation is a complicated exercise. Currently, 
the law does not appear to be clear. However, it 
is generally assumed that addressing exploitative 
conduct involves tight regulation and price 
monitoring. Nevertheless, sometimes also typical 
merger remedies can be used, as happened for 
example in the E.On cases, where the Commission 
explored the route of the sale of generation capacity.
As for exclusionary conducts put in place by 
vertical integrated platforms, one of the main open 
questions remains whether discrimination to favour 
an affiliate company in a neighbouring market 
constitutes an abuse. Attendees noted that the case 
law does not provide a clear answer; anyhow, some 
of them appeared sceptical in accepting the idea that 
a dominant undertaking have a general duty not 
to discriminate under Article 102 TFEU between 
affiliates and competitors.
Having a closer look at the electricity markets, 
participants agreed on the fact that there the use of 
structural commitments is broader. The E.On cases 
in fact are not a unicum: the cases were taken up by 
national competition authorities, among others in 
France and Italy. In addition, attendees shared the 
view that nowadays, regulatory instruments such as 
REMIT can pursue market manipulation practices 
finalised at avoiding monopolisation. In those cases 
then, regulation and competition seem to flow in 
the same direction. 
A common belief among the audience was that new 
platforms are less understood than the traditional 
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ones. As a way of example, participants wondered 
whether in the Google case, the capacity of 
improving your services because of the fact that you 
know users since a longer time constitutes per sé an 
entry barrier. Similarly, they wondered about the 
role of experience, and about is capability to impede 
competitors’ entry in the market. 
7. Regulation and Competition 
Attendees finally reflected at length on the relation 
between regulation and competition with regard to 
traditional and online platforms. Some argued that 
we might need to rethink about the objectives of 
competition law. Some noted that competition law is 
influenced by regulatory targets, and that therefore 
the two needed to be read together. This is especially 
true, for example, concerning the e-commerce, 
where the Commission’s sector enquiry should 
be interpreted also in the light of the numerous 
regulatory interventions both at European and 
national level. 
In any case, in order to assess the relation between 
regulation and competition, one of the key 
questions remained whether the former implements 
competition goals, or goes further than this. While in 
the 90s competition law was used to reach legislative 
goals, on the contrary we should now interrogate 
on the reasons behind the shift from competition 
to regulation. Attendees debated on what is the 
standard to call for a regulatory intervention; some 
sustained that regulation should be used only if 
competition law is not a sufficient tool, as it was 
done in the telecom sector, while others suggested 
the possibility of broader intervention. However, it 
must be said that the majority of attendees seemed 
cautious in pushing for more regulatory intervention 
than what it is necessary to preserve competition 
in the market. Rather, some suggested the path of 
regular meetings among decision-makers and the 
industry, to engage in a constructive interaction 
leading to satisfactory forms of self-regulation. 
Broadening the perspective, participants also 
suggested that in this context the new trend of 
mergers among competition and regulatory 
authorities could be useful, and that in any case, 
a stricter collaboration among the two could be 
positive. By way of example, regulatory authorities 
could be called to express opinions on competition 
authorities’ planned interventions. It was a common 
feeling that nowadays, politicians are becoming 
more intransigent with competition authorities, 
putting on them a lot of pressure because of 
high expectations that sometimes overtake the 
competition goals. Also for this reason, the support 
of the regulatory authorities could be advantageous.
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